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5 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Saturday, 1 July 1961, 2:30 to 5:00 p.m.


1. The DCI commenced the meeting with a brief introductory statement, staying quite closely to the text of the notes which he had prepared without referring to them. The only question that arose at this time was whether CIA had lost any personnel because of Cuba. The DCI said he did not think we had had any resignations directly as a result of the Cuban Operation and turned to the undersigned who agreed that this was the case.

2. The DCI then went on with the presentation of some recommendations on which the views or recommendations of the President's Board were sought. He passed out copies of his recommendations to each of the members of the Board.

Recommendation No. 1: Elicited the comment from General Taylor that the Killian Board had not been fully briefed on his recommendations nor was he certain that Presidential action had yet been taken. The DCI commented that the President had already taken action on some of the recommendations of the Taylor Group inasmuch as he had received an implementing memorandum from Mr. Bundy. General Taylor commented that he had been away and had not yet seen this. The

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General Taylor asked if this was not the type of problem that should be put before the 5412 Group. The DCI agreed. General Taylor asked that all of the facts and figures be available for the next 5412 meeting.

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
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Recommendation No. 2: Brought a prompt agreement from General Taylor. The DCI pointed out that there had been estimates prepared on Cuba and that the Board of Estimates had prepared memoranda

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recalled this and pointed out that the estimate had been made at the request of the Department.

Recommendation No. 3: Immediately evoked questions as to who was on the Board of Estimates and the present method of selection of the members. The DCI mentioned several of the names of the Board including all three military. Mr. Clifford asked how estimates were prepared and this resulted in a fairly lengthy discussion of the estimating process and the role that the Board and USIB played in this. The DCI stressed that it was very important that the Defense Department represent an individual and not a departmental view and cited General Barnes as having on occasion taken a differing view from that of the Air Force. There was some discussion as to whether any senior Foreign Service Officers had ever served on the Board. There appeared to be general agreement that it was important to get men of quality rather than representatives of the Departments. The DCI stressed that this was why he indicated that the selection would be by consultation between himself and the Secretaries of State and Defense rather than by asking them for nominations. There then followed some discussion of what the elevation of the Board of Estimates to a Deputy Directorship would accomplish. The DCI noted that whereas it went through the DD/I at present, this was more as a formality than a fact. He said that he thought the elevation would give it more prestige and respect. Mr. Murphy commented that what was most important was getting good estimates and it was his impression that these had been constantly improving over the years. On this same subject, but at a later time in the meeting, Gordon Gray said that in regard to this proposal he would also add that it would emphasize the national level and the character of estimates.

Recommendation No. 4: Brought no particular comment of note although there was a general reaction that there were too many requirements that were too broad and, in certain instances, duplicative. The DCI said that he felt a good part of this was in the Defense Department and that he hoped the Defense intelligence reorganization would help in this regard.

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Recommendation No. 5: Resulted in considerable discussion and comment on the particular subject of whether the Clandestine Services could be buried. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] There was then some discussion as to whether the Clandestine Services could be severed from the rest of CIA and the DCI said that he thought it was useful for the rest of CIA to provide an umbrella over the Clandestine Services.

Recommendation No. 6: The Director noted that it had been mentioned to him by the President. The DCI said he didn't believe it will be possible to completely stop congressional hearings but that he would like to cut them down and not appear before Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations. Mr. Murphy commented that this used to be the DCI's policy. There was then some discussion as to who else would appear and the DCI noted that it was particularly hard to resist demands for his own appearance, noting that of the 17 appearances CIA has made during this session he has appeared 14 times. This then evoked general comment on how well known CIA personnel were and an indication that the Board felt that too many people in CIA were too well known. [REDACTED]

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Recommendation No. 7: Brought the request from General Taylor that we provide him with a detailed plan on how the USIB would meet requirements for early warning of developing cold war crisis situations. This also brought a comment from Gordon Gray that it reminded him of the fact that he wanted to correct a mis-impression which Roger Hilsman may have left with the Board to the effect that State was not advised of cold war operations. Gray said that this was in fact not true and that State was advised in advance.

Recommendation No. 8: Brought a general indication of agreement from the Board which apparently sensed that State-CIA relations were not good. [REDACTED]

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He said that this matter had been on [REDACTED] desk for some time but that no action had ever resulted. He pointed out that we provided

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Recommendation No. 9: Brought up the question from Dr. Killian as to whether the DCI wasn't simply asking whether the new administration agreed with an action of the previous one. The DCI pointed out that there had been nothing political about the date on which the NSC acted and the President approved the Joint Study Group recommendations, stressing the fact that the report had been submitted on exactly the day it was required and that it had been acted upon most promptly. The Board seemed to agree that reaffirmation was important. General Taylor asked that he be provided with a list of those Joint Study Group recommendations which we felt were not being properly implemented at this time.

Recommendation No. 10: Brought little comment except general agreement that this was a difficult problem.

3. After the DCI completed the presentation of his recommendations there then followed about 45 minutes of discussion which was concerned almost exclusively with moving the DCI physically closer to the President

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and requiring him by Presidential direction to devote 80% of his time to coordination, and perhaps presenting intelligence to the President, and 20% of his time to CIA. Perhaps the most significant statement made during this discussion was one made by Dr. Killian -- "If you were asked to make a recommendation for a change, in order to meet pressure that some sort of change should be made, what would your proposal be as to the minimum the DCI would require if he moved to the White House?". Further, General Doolittle asked how many people the DCI would take to the Executive Office Building if he were asked to move. The DCI commented on this that it would be logical to take all of the DD/I except perhaps [] but that he would like to have the [] there would certainly be a requirement to be close to National Estimates and Current Intelligence. The DCI then commented upon how favorable it was for him to have immediate and prompt access to the Clandestine Services personnel to go over the several hundred cables he read each day and discuss with them their origin. General Taylor then raised the question as to how long it would take the DCI to get to the White House from the new building and commented on how bad it was from the Pentagon during rush hour. There was discussion as to whether the DCI should still chair USIB if he moved. General Taylor said he had talked to all of the members of the USIB except AEC and FBI and that the majority of them had favored moving the coordinator out of CIA. The question was asked as to when the move to the new building would be started and the DCI explained. There was then a brief run-down on how many would be in the new building, how many would be left out and where those left out would be located. Dr. Killian asked what the Director's views would be toward changing the name of CIA and mentioned that this had been raised on several occasions by the President. The DCI was asked whether morale was poor in CIA at this time and he said that without question all of the press reports on changes and the uncertainty that was in the air had affected morale. The DCI further stressed that when you have a problem in an organization you deal with that part of the organization which has the problem, and that he felt that the other parts of CIA were in good shape.

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SIGNED

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Orig: DCI

cc: DDCI

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